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OSR Comments on DIA Summary
Statement Concerning Warsaw Pact Capabilities
in Central Europe After the Crisis

Paragraph 2: This misquotes Sejna,

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Paragraph 3: The DIA comments conclude-- apparently from the fact that the Czech forces have resumed training--that they have "made a marked recovery." Our evidence suggests that the Czech forces are demoralized and understrength.

Paragraph 4: The DIA comments seem to suggest that Soviet acquiescence in the continued Czech occupation of the Western border regions is a sign of confidence. More likely, it reflects Soviet reluctance to write off the Czech forces as a viable contribution to the Pact. To do so would amount to admission of failure of the USSR's Warsaw Pact military policy, and could oblige the Soviets to take drastic steps to fill the void. The Soviets are probably astute enough to recognize that NATO's appreciation of the Czech threat is what really counts and so long as they can maintain the semblance of that threat, the general NATO-Warsaw Pact balance should remain reasonably stable.

Paragraph 5: The Soviet deployment in Czechoslovakia is not even remotely similar to that in East Germany. In East Germany the GSFG is nearly four times the size of the indigenous force and clearly in full control of the tactical situation.

Paragraph 6: The OSR memorandum did not suggest that the Czechs would not defend themselves; it was carefully limited to a judgment as to their usefulness for Soviet initiatives.

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Paragraph 8: Rumors of additional Soviet forces in Germany and Hungary have been endemic since last summer. They have apparently been spawned by the many unusual troop movements through these countries attendant on the Czech crisis and by the rather extensive Soviet construction program which has been in progress for the past 3 or 4 years. The construction program seems to be largely aimed at replacing delapidated old prewar facilities, along with a rather large-scale program for providing dependent housing. We are watching this one closely, but so far we've seen no convincing evidence of any reinforcement in either country.

Paragraph 9: We now have evidence that six of the 10-13 divisions estimated to have been mobilized are now in Category II status. One other has apparently remained in Czechoslovakia. There is no evidence at all that any units in the USSR remain mobilized. We consider that the evidence supports a firm estimate that demobilization is complete.

Paragraph 11: The evidence on CGF order of battle is essentially the same as it was when the Memorandum was published. Perhaps [] will shed some light on this admittedly vexing question.

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Paragraph 12: We do not consider that VESNA-69 gave any indication of the CGF's primary role. The exercise was probably intended mainly to demonstrate that the Czech forces were still in the Pact. In any case, we have very little information as to what the exercise was really about and are not even certain that the Soviets participated.

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